Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 61

Issue 3

Article 7

1973

Double Jeopardy and the New Kentucky Penal Code
Neil S. Hackworth
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Hackworth, Neil S. (1973) "Double Jeopardy and the New Kentucky Penal Code," Kentucky Law Journal:
Vol. 61: Iss. 3, Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol61/iss3/7

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

1973]

PENAL CODE-DouBLE JEOPArDY

DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE NEW KENTUCKY
PENAL CODE
INTRODUCTION

Double jeopardy, a complicated and often confusing constitutional principle which has produced extensive litigation and numerous
commentaries, resists easy categorization or precise definition, and
attempts to codify it could easily create more problems than it solves.
However, in spite of the inherent precariousness of the task, the drafters
of the new Kentucky Penal Code' have codified the law of double
jeopardy.2 These new statutory provisions represent the General
Assembly's first attempt to deal with double jeopardy.
In the past Kentucky, like most jurisdictions, protected defendants
from being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense through
constitutional provisions 3 and common law doctrine. 4 The constitutional principle expressed in very broad and general terms, necessarily
required judicial interpretation. Consequently, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals has heard numerous cases involving double jeopardy issues.
Unfortunately, the Court has often taken inconsistent positions upon
the issues while treating the cases as if there were no conflict between
them.5 Such inconsistencies are not easily resolved, and resulted in
much confusion concerning the precise scope of the constitutional
prohibition. 6 Hopefully, the new statutory approach will resolve some
of the conflict.
In addition to the difficult task of reducing the double jeopardy
principle to a legislative enactment, the General Assembly was faced
with a difficult constitutional problem. When the legislature enacts
provisions affecting a constitutional principle, the legislation must be
flexible enough to endure possible judicial extensions of that principle
or it will be vulnerable to future constitutional attacks." Therefore,
' The KENTUCKY PENAL CODE enacted by the 1972 General Assembly becomes effective July 1, 1974.
2 Ky. AcTs ch. 385 §§ 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 (1972) [chapter 385 is hereinafter
cited as KYPC] [PnoPosED Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 433C.3-020 to 433C.3-0601 [hereinafter cited as [KRS.
3 Kentucky was the second state to adopt a constitutional provision nearly
identical to the federal clause. See J. Siran, DouBLE JEoPARDY 78-83 (1969)

[hereinafter cited as SiGrm].
4 Id. at 16-27.
5 See notes 135-43 infra and accompanying text.
6 SIGL,Er, supra note 3, at 100.

7 The risk of a successful constitutional attack diminishes with the use of
broader statutory language. A narrow statutory provision runs a greater risk due
to the fact that the court's interpretation of the double jeopardy provision has never
been predictable. Id.
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any legislation dealing with double jeopardy must be consistent with
the policies upon which the constitutional prohibition is based.
This note will explore the double jeopardy provisions of the Kentucky Penal Code to determine their meaning and, more importantly,
whether they accomplish their purposes. I will first explore the need
for statutory reform and examine the rationale for including these
provisions in the Code. Next, the new provisions will be discussed and
compared with present law and alternative reforms, and the policies
behind the constitutional provision analyzed to determine whether
these new enactments are consistent therewith. Finally, possible
improvements upon the new statutory provisions will be suggested.
I. TiH NEED FOR STATUTORY REFORM
The double jeopardy clause contained in the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution is expressed in the following language:
"... nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb... ."I' The section dealing with double
jeopardy in the Kentucky Constitution is essentially a copy of the
federal provision.9 These constitutional mandates, the basis for the
double jeopardy protection granted a defendant in Kentucky are
directed at the prosecutor and the judiciary. In essence these
provisions limit the power of the state, acting through its judicial
system, to cumulatively punish any criminal defendant or to harass
him with multiple trials, 10 thereby preventing the state from gaining
an unfair advantage in criminal prosecutions. However, no limits are
placed on the power of the legislature to create additional crimes or
to impose harsh punishments."
The need for statutory reform in the area of double jeopardy has
developed largely because the General Assembly has created new
crimes. Originally, this country's criminal law was based primarily
upon the common law, which included only a limited number of
crimes. When a common law criminal act was committed, it generally
resulted in only one criminal violation. The defendant underwent one
criminal prosecution, and the double jeopardy clause barred any subsequent prosecution. Therefore, the constitutional double jeopardy
prohibition provided adequate protection to a defendant given the
8 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969),
which held that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.
9 Ky.CONST. § 13.
10 Note, Twice in jeopardy, 75 YAi= L.J. 262, 266-67 (1965).
11 Id. at 302-04.
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criminal justice system which existed at the time of its enactment. 12
When legislative provisions defining criminal conduct replaced the
common law as the primary source of criminal law, the protection
provided by the double jeopardy clause was weakened. To protect
its citizens from an increasing number of criminal activities, legislatures
rapidly increased the number of statutory offenses. 13 Thus the situation
developed where particular conduct could violate several criminal
statutes permitting the prosecution to obtain a conviction under any
of them. Therefore, the power of the prosecutor became greatly enhanced. He could (1) use these multiple offense crimes to obtain a
guilty plea to one or more of the charges, (2) try the defendant
upon one or more of the offenses and reserve action on the remaining
offenses in case he failed to get a conviction at the first trial, or (8)
increase the initial punishment by subsequent convictions. This permitted the prosecutor to use these multiple offenses to increase the
probability of obtaining a guilty verdict or securing the punishment
he believed appropriate. One writer described the problem as follows:
The great range of choices presented the prosecution is due to
the multiplication of legislatively created criminal categories.
Every new criminal statute further extends the alternatives available to the prosecution while increasing the number of possible
convictions and sentences which a defendant may suffer. A deed
which might have violated one criminal proscription in 1800 may
14
violate five today.
When the prosecutor's task of proving the defendant's guilt is made
easier, the defendant's ability to establish his innocence is made more
difficult.'; Therefore, it is important that the courts and legislature
consider whether they have provided the prosecutor with excessive
power and discretion. If the judgment of the police and the prosecutor
could always be trusted, there would be no need for trial by jury.
However, prosecutors do make mistakes and can be overzealous in
their attempts to prove a particular defendant's guilt. Further, there
are instances where a prosecutor has apparently used multiple
prosecutions to harass a defendant.16 Courts have often overlooked
these obvious abuses, and it has become relatively common to find
an accused charged with several separate and distinct statutory
offenses, although he committed only one criminal act.' 7
12

Id. at 279; cf. SIGLER, supra note 3, at 170.

13 SicrGE, supra note 3, at 181.
14 Id. at 64.

15 Id. at 166.
'aId. at 168-69.
17 See, e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
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Based upon court interpretations of the double jeopardy clauses
of the federal and state constitutions, the prosecutor is permitted to
try a defendant twice for what amounts to the same aberrant conduct.' This result has produced extensive criticism from commentators and legal scholars who believe that it is fundamentally
unfair to subject a defendant to multiple prosecutions for essentially
the same criminal conduct. 19 They argue that to try someone twice
for the same conduct by the simple expedient of applying different
labels to that conduct violates the spirit of the double jeopardy clause.
The elimination of this injustice is normally dependent solely upon the
constitutional protection of the double jeopardy clause; however, the
courts have been generally unreceptive to this argument. Even those
courts which have on occasion extended the scope of the double
jeopardy principle to cover multiple offense situations have failed to
be consistent in the application of the principle, frequently retreating
20
to a more restricted application in subsequent cases.
Various tests have evolved to define the scope of the double
jeopardy clause based upon what is perceived to be the underlying
policy of the constitutional principle. Of these tests, the four most
common are the "same offense" test, the "same
evidence" test, the
2
"same act" test, and the "same transaction" test. '
The "same offense" test is the most restrictive. If the offenses are
located in different places in the statute books, there is more than
one offense and multiple prosecutions are appropriate.22 This test pays
little, if any, attention to the substantive content of the offenses to
ascertain whether they prohibit identical activity. If a separate
definition is provided in the statutes, the prosecutor is free to use
each offense against the defendant. The "same offense" test, therefore,
gives broad powers to the prosecutor and allows him to use multiple
offenses to potentially unfair advantage.
The "same evidence" test, which is most commonly adopted by
the courts,23 provides that if an act constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the defendant may be prosecuted for
24
each if each statute requires proof of facts not required by the other

This test is based upon the proposition that the legislature has the
power to create as many offenses as it deems necessary from a single
18 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ladusaw, 10 S.W.2d 1089 (Ky. 1928).
19 See SiGrEaR, supra note 3, at 193.
20

See notes 135-43 infra and accompanying text.
Other tests have been developed, but most are closely related to these four
tests. See Note, Twice in Jeopardy,supra note 10, at 269-77.
22 SmLrER, supra note 3, at 66-67.
21
23
24

Id. at 66.
Id.
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criminal transaction.
Courts utilizing the "same evidence" test
assert that to hold otherwise would limit the legislature's power to
make law, and that the double jeopardy clause was never intended to
restrict the legislature in this manner.26 As long as a fact not proved
at the first trial must be proved at the second, the prosecutor is free
to bring multiple prosecutions.
The "same evidence" test does not eliminate the potential unfairness
to the defendant of being twice tried for essentially the same bad
conduct as is illustrated in Gore v. United States. 27 In Gore the defendant's criminal conduct was selling narcotics; however, he was
charged with three offenses: selling narcotics without a written order,
selling narcotics in a container other than the original stamped package,
and facilitating the concealment and sale of narcotics. The Supreme
Court held that the double jeopardy clause did not apply since each
offense required proof of a different fact.28 The defendant in Gore
was clearly the victim of overlapping crimes which could be used in a
manner fundamentally unfair to him.
The "same act" test weakens the power of the prosecutor and
extends greater protection to the defendant under the double jeopardy
clause. 20 This test provides that if two offenses result from the same
act, the defendant cannot be tried for both. Therefore, if this test
were applied to the Gore case, the defendant would be guilty of only
one offense, since he committed only one criminal act, i.e., selling
narcotics.
The "same transaction" test, similar in scope to the "same act"
test, prevents the state from prosecuting a defendant a second time
for any offense arising out of the same criminal transaction or episode.30
The "same transaction" test tends to weaken the power of the prosecutor and eliminates unfairness created by overlapping statutes.
Exactly what amounts to the same criminal transaction or same
criminal act is not easily determined. Different courts, using the
above tests, have reached opposite results.3 1 None of the tests
actually provides a solution to the problem. "The principle shortcoming of [the same act or transaction] approach is that any sequence
of conduct can be defined as an 'act' or a 'transaction'." 32 Therefore,
25

Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 10, at 302-04.

26 Id.
27357 U.S. 386 (1958).
28 Id. at 389.
29

Ssxcg, supra note 3, at 67.

30 Id.

3
1 Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 10,
32 Id. at 276. See also SiGrEB, supra note

at 276-77.
3, at 68, where the author states:
In cases in which a single physical movement has produced several
(Continued on next page)
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if critics hope to eliminate the unfairness created by overlapping
statutes, they must look elsewhere. Since the courts have not provided
the answer, redefining double jeopardy by statute is a reasonable
alternative. A properly drawn legislative enactment could restore
the principle of double jeopardy to the effective safeguard it was
prior to the legislative proliferation of overlapping statutory crimes. 33
By providing a precise definition of its scope, such statutes could
facilitate understanding and application of the doctrine.
Double jeopardy legislation must balance the interests of the
prosecution with the rights of the defendant. Although defendants
must be protected from unscrupulous and overzealous prosecutors,
the prosecutor's effectiveness must not be eliminated or seriously
reduced.34 The drafters of the Kentucky Penal Code have attempted
to strike this balance in the provisions dealing with double jeopardy.
The next section will attempt to determine to what extent these major
interests have been protected.
II. TBE CODE PROVISIONS
The Kentucky Penal Code devotes five sections to double jeopardy.
The first section concerns multiple offenses committed by a defendant
and determines whether he is subject to prosecution and conviction
for each separate offense 35 The other four sections focus upon the

effect of a former prosecution upon a subsequent prosecution under
varying circumstances: (1) a former prosecution for the same
offense; 36 (2) a former prosecution for a different offense; 37 (3) a
former prosecution in another jurisdiction;3 8 and (4) a former prosecution fraudulently procured by a defendant for the purposes of preventing the state from prosecuting him for a more serious offense and
a former prosecution obtained in a court lacking jurisdiction.3 9
Discussion of these individual sections will include examination of the
effect each will have upon existing case law with particular emphasis
on whether the new provisions sufficiently strengthen the double
jeopardy principle to remedy the difficulties that provided the impetus
for statutory reform.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

statutory violations, the single act,' 'single transaction,' 'same offense,'

and 'same evidence' rules have been used more as a justification and
rationalization of desired results than as an analytical tool.
33 SIr-t, supra note 3, at 189.
34 Id. at 181.
35 KYPC § 45 [KRS § 433C.3-020].
36 KYP § 46 [KRS § 433C.3-030].

37 KYPC § 47 [KRS § 433C.3-040].
as KYFC § 48 [KRS § 433C.3-050].
39 KYP § 49 [KRS § 438C.8-0601.
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A. The Power to ProsecuteFor Multiple Offenses
Because of statutory overlap, rarely does criminal conduct give rise
to a single offense; rather the defendant is often subject to charges for
multiple offenses. 40 This situation demands inquiry into whether the
prosecutor should be given the option of bringing all charges against
the defendant, or whether he should have some limitations placed
upon him. If the prosecutor is allowed to prosecute the defendant
for multiple offenses arising from the same criminal activity, he may
be in a position to overcharge or harass the defendant, thereby gaining
an unfair advantage. 4 1 On the other hand, if he is not allowed to
bring all related charges against the defendant, the prosecutor may be
placed at the distinct disadvantage of having to select the offense
which he believes presents the strongest case. 42 Further, it is difficult
to know in advance what the proof will show since charges must
frequently be brought before there is time for extensive investigation.
Since the defendant has a right to be informed of the charges against
him and the prosecutor's right to amend indictments is severely
limited, the state is probably justified in bringing charges to cover
43
every contingency of proof at the trial.
The Kentucky Penal Code provides that the state may prosecute
the defendant for all offenses arising from his criminal conduct,
adopting the view that the need to provide the prosecutor with this
power outweighs any disadvantage placed upon the defendant. The
text of KYPC § 45 [KRS § 488C.3-020] is as follows:
(1) When a single course of conduct of a defendant may establish
the commission of more than one offense, he may be prosecuted
for each such offense. He may not, however, be convicted of more
than one offense when:
(a) One offense is included in the other, as in Subsection (2);
or
(b) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the
commission of the offenses; or
(c) The offense is designed to prohibit a continuing course of
conduct and the defendant's course of conduct was uninterrupted by legal process, unless the law expressly provides
that specific periods of such conduct constitute separate offenses.
(2) A defendant may be convicted of an offense that is included
in any offense with which he is formally charged. An offense is
so included when:
40
See 1 NATIONAL COMMnsS1ON ON REFoRm OF FEDmAL CRiMINAL LAws,
WomaNo Ppmis 332 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WonNG PAPERs].
41 Id. at 334.

42 Id. at 335.
43 Id.
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(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the
facts required to establish the commission of the offenses
charged; or
(b) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged
or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect
that a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission; or
(d) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that
a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, prop44
erty or public interest suffices to establish its commission.
These provisions only partially restrict the power of the prosecutor in
multiple offenses situations since limitations are placed on the conviction rather than the prosecution of the defendant.45
Historically, the prosecutor has been free to charge a defendant
46
In many
with all offenses arising from his criminal conduct.
where
example,
For
instances this would seem both fair and logical.
guard
a
kills
escape,
to
the defendant robs a bank and, in his attempt
defendant
the
for
or steals a car, the legislature probably intended
to be tried for each separate offense and suffer the consequences of
multiple convictions, since he has demonstrated a criminal proclivity
which makes him more dangerous to society. 47 However, not all
offenses arising from a single criminal transaction involve distinctly
separate criminal acts, or demonstrate greater criminal proclivity.
Although difficult to categorize, several multiple offense patterns occur
with some regularity and do not justify separate charges, multiple
trials or greater punishment.
One recurring multiple offense pattern involves situations where
"different legal norms enter into apparent or real competition for the
punishment of the same act." 48 This is clearly demonstrated in Gore
v. United States,49 where the defendant was charged and convicted
of violating laws controlling the importation, taxation, and prescription
50
of narcotic drugs, although his only act was selling the drugs.
A second multiple offense situation occurs where "a single activity
is divided into different independent parcels, different stages of which
44 KYPC § 45 [KRS § 433C.3-020].
See KENTucKY LEGISLATIVE REsEARcH Co blISSION, KENTUCKY PENAL. CODE
§ 610,
4 Commentary (Final Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as LRCI.
6 See LRC § 610, Commentary.
47 This is assuming, of course, that there is some validity to increasing the
45

=unishment of a defendant whose criminal acts and criminal tendencies are more
to society.
angerous
4
8WoRKIN P.M'ns, supra.note 40, at 333.
49 357 U.S. 386 (1968).

50 See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
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are made separately criminal." 51 This includes the inchoate crime
and the complete crime, i.e., attempted robbery and robbery. Burglary
and larceny are also covered since burglary is often preliminary to
larceny. Crimes that have been divided into various stages are included, i.e., possession of forgery devices, forgery, possession of forged
instruments, and uttering a forged instrument. Finally, crimes that
have traditionally been considered lesser included offenses would fall
within this category since they often involve different stages or degrees of the same criminal activity.
A third pattern encompasses circumstances in which a single act
gives rise to criminal liability under both a special and a general
statute, such as automobile theft and general theft.52 Multiple charges
and punishment are clearly illogical under these circumstances.
A fourth multiple offense situation involves offenses which must
inevitably be committed together, 53 such as stealing a check and forging an endorsement upon it. Included in this category would be a
series of repeated offenses closely related in time, such as robbing
several victims at the same time.
The final multiple offense situation involves instances in which
one act results in injury to more than one victim.5 4 This occurs, for
example, where two persons are shot or killed, although the defendant
fired his pistol only once.
Under KYPC § 45 [KRS § 483C.8-020], the prosecutor remains
free to charge the defendant with all overlapping and multiple offenses
in the situations described above; however, limitations are placed
upon conviction. For example, under KYPC § 45(1) (a) [KRS §
433C.8-020(1) (a)], the defendant cannot be convicted of both the
greater offense and an included offense.55 This limitation, based on
the rationale that a defendant should be subject to punishment only
for the most serious offense growing out of the criminal activity committed, is consistent with existing law, which has long recognized the
lesser included offense doctrine.5 6
The second limitation, KYPC § 45(1) (b) [KRS 438C.3-020(1) (b)],
covers situations where the defendant is indicted in the alternative. 57
Since it would be legally impossible to be guilty of two offenses con51

WonmNc

PAPERs,

52 Id. at 332-33.
53 Id. at 333.

supra note 40, at 333.

54 Id. at 333-34.
55LRC § 610, Commentary.
56 Id.citing Hughes v. Commonwealth, 115 S.W. 744 (Ky. 1909).
57
Since the state is free to prosecute the defendant for conflicting offenses, the
situation is analogous to the civil practice of pleading in the alternative.
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sisting of the same conduct but requiring different mental states, the
defendant can be convicted for only one of the offenses. The Commentary to the Kentucky Penal Code [hereinafter cited as Commentary] provides the following example:
D takes the automobile of another without the latter's consent. His
conduct could constitute a commission of two distinct offenses, one
being larceny (which requires an intent to deprive the owner of the
car permanently) and the other being "joy-riding" (which requires an intent to deprive the owner of temporary use of the car).
A conviction of both of these offenses could result only from inconsistent findings of fact, i.e., an intent to deprive permanently in one
and an intent to deprive temporarily in the other.58
KYPC § 45(1)(c) [KRS § 483C.8-020(1)(c)] constitutes the final
limitation upon the number of convictions that can be obtained against
a defendant involved in a continuing offense situation. The Commentary to the final draft of KYPC illustrates this limitation with the
crime of nonsupport.5 9 The mere fact that a defendant has been guilty
of nonsupport over an extended period of time does not give rise to
more than one offense. The legislature must either specify a period
that gives rise to a second offense or the defendant must be indicted
for one period of time and then fail to terminate his activity or
omission, which would give rise to a second offense over a second
period of time. Although consistent with existing law in Kentucky,6 0
the need for this restriction is questionable, since it serves more as a
definition of a continuing offense than as any real limitation of the
prosecutor's power. Essentially a rule of construction, it does not
prevent the legislature from multiplying offenses. Unlike the other
two limitations, the legislature could defeat this one by specifically
multiplying the offense after certain time periods. Therefore, because
of the General Assembly's inherent power to define criminal conduct,
this limitation serves little purpose.
These provisions of the double jeopardy statutes restrict the prosecutor to a relatively limited extent and ignore other complications
created by overlapping and multiple offense situations. However, due to
the Code's expanded definition of "included offenses,"6 1 the limitation
upon conviction for both the greater and the included offense
essentially eliminates the prosecutor's power to obtain a conviction
in many multiple offense situations where multiple conviction would
58

LRC § 610, Commentary.

59 Id.

60 Id. citing Wilson v. Cooper, 60 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1933).
KYPC § 45(2) [KRS § 433C.3-020(2)1. See text accompanying notes 79-83
61

infra.
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be inappropriate.12 But other of the multiple offense problems previously discussed remain. Therefore, KYPC § 45 [KRS § 433C.8-020]
fails to completely resolve all the problems created by overlapping
and multiple offenses; as the defendant is subject not only to multiple
charges, but also to multiple convictions and to multiple punishment
in many instances.
Advocates of statutory double jeopardy standards have suggested
a variety of methods for reducing the ills of prosecution for multiple
offenses. 3 The most highly regarded technique is the compulsory
joinder approach of the American Law Institutes's Model Penal Code,64
which provides that "a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials
for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the
same criminal episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate
prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial
and are within the jurisdiction of a single court."65 The elimination
of multiple trials for overlapping offenses by forcing the prosecutor
to join all charges in a single accusation is the single most important
innovation in the reform of double jeopardy law since it resolves
many of the problem situations previously discussed. 66 It significantly
diminishes the prosecution's power to force a defendant to undergo
a second prosecution for essentially the same conduct as a means of
either increasing the probability of a finding of guilt or increasing
punishment by additional convictions and sentences. On the other
hand, compulsory joinder is only a partial remedy.67 Since the
defendant can still be tried and convicted for all offenses arising from
the same criminal conduct or episode except included offenses, he
remains subject to multiple punishment if the offenses are properly
joined. Therefore, the basic injustice and irrationality of the existing
law would survive enactment of a compulsory joinder provision
alone.0 8

The drafters of the Kentucky Penal Code rejected compulsory
joinder. This omission was not, however, due to the fact that it is
only a partial remedy since no other provision was substituted to provide more complete relief. It would seem at first glance that the
drafters simply overlooked or ignored the significance of the prosecutor's power to seek convictions at multiple trials. If compulsory
62 See text accompanying notes 48-55 supra.
63 SICTEi,

supranote 3, at 199 n.36.

64MOD PENA CODE § 1.07(a) (Official Draft 1962).
60 Id.
66 SIGLE, supra note 3, at 213.

Id. at 223.
6sBut see text accompanying notes 70-76 infra.
67
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joinder was intentionally omitted, the rationale for inclusion of the
other double jeopardy provisions is a complete mystery unless intended merely as a codification of pre-Code case law.
Perhaps, rather than intending to overlook the problems created
by multiple offenses, multiple trials and multiple punishment, the
drafters perceived the Penal Code to be an inappropriate vehicle for
establishing compulsory joinder, a procedural device.6 9 Following
this line of reasoning, compulsory joinder would be more appropriately
enacted by amendment to the Rules of Criminal Procedure by the
Court of Appeals. Unfortunately, this approach allows the possibility
that no action will be taken by the Court. Further, assuming the
Court should decide to amend its rules, the law of double jeopardy
would then be scattered among three compilations: the constitution,
the statutes, and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Unless care is taken
to coordinate these various provisions, greater confusion may result.
There is further indication that the drafters of the Code did not
completely ignore the difficulties created by multiple convictions. In
KYPC § 270 [KRS § 485A.1-110], the drafters restrict multiple punishment through consecutive sentences. A misdemeanor and a felony
will always run concurrently and both convictions will be satisfied
by service of the felony term. 7 The aggregate of consecutive sentences
for conviction of two or more misdemeanors shall be not more than
one year, i.e., the maximum misdemeanor term of imprisonment 711
The aggregate of consecutive sentences for conviction of two or more
felonies shall be not greater than the longest term authorized under
the habitual criminal statute72 for the highest class of crime for which
the consecutive sentences are imposed. 73 Under the habitual offender
statute, convictions for a Class A felony would limit the court to
the sentence for the Class A felony.74 If the highest offense for which
the defendant is convicted is a Class B felony, the court is limited to a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; 75 if the highest offense is a
16
class C or D felony, the court is limited to a sentence of 20 years.
Therefore, the defendant is provided some protection against excessive
punishment through conviction for multiple offenses.
The included offense limitation, probably the most significant
restriction found in KYPC § 45 [KRS § 488C.8-020], extends the
69 Siarxn, supra note 3, at 207.

70KYPC § 270(1) (a)[KRS § 435A.1-110(1) (a)].
71 KYPC § 270(1)(b) [KRS § 435A.1-110(1) (b)].
72 KYPC § 267 [KRS § 435A.1-080].
73 KYPC § 270(l)(c) [KRS § 435A.1-11O(l)(e)].
74 LRC § 3445, Commentary.
75 KYPC § 267(4)(a) [KRS § 435A.1-80(4)(a)].

76 KYPC § 267(4 )(b) [KRS § 435A.1-080(4) (b)].
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common law definition of included offenses. Case law defines an
included offense as one that requires proof of the same or less than
all the facts required to prove the offense charged. 77 However, there
are offenses that require proof of different facts that also appear to
come within the definition of an included offense. For instance,
negligent homicide would seem to have been intended as an included
offense of murder, since the offenses differ only as to the degree of
intent involved. However, negligent and intentional are different
mental states and require proof of a different fact. Therefore, under
the traditional definition negligent homicide would not be an included offense of murder.
The Code has abolished this illogical distinction and includes
under its definition of included offense those offenses that require
proof of a "lesser kind of culpability"78 or a 'less serious injury or risk
of injury to the same person, property or public interest."79 Under this
definition negligent homicide would be an included offense of murder
since it only requires proof of a lesser kind of culpability. Assault
would be an included offense of murder, assuming there was a question
as to whether the defendant's assault was the cause of the victim's
death, since assault differs from murder only as to the seriousness of
the injury and the type of intent involved.80 Consistent with existing
law, the new Code defines an attempt as an included offense.8 '
Some difficulties may arise from this expanded definition of included offense. Since the defendant can be convicted for an included
offense on evidence presented to substantiate the greater charge,8 2 the
defendant might argue that the expanded definition of included offense
violates his sixth amendment right "to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation."8 3 Under the traditional definition (i.e., "proof
of the same or less than all the facts required to prove the greater
offense") the defendant would necessarily be defending against the
lesser included offense when he defended against the greater.84 Under
the new test, however, the defendant may have to defend against a
broad spectrum of conceptually different yet related crimes without
being given specific notice of additional charges. In other words, some
supra note 3,at 107.
KYPC § 45(2)(d) [KRS § 433C.3-020(2)(d)].
8
0 LRC § 610, Commentary.
s
KYPC § 45(2)(b) [KRS § 433C.3-020(2)(b)].
82
See LRC § 610, Commentary, citing Ky. R.Cium. P.9.86.
83 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
84 This isbecause proof of any different or additional facts was not required to
be offered. The accused would, therefore, defend against allthe elements of the
lesser included offense.
77 SIGLER,

78 KYPC § 45(2) (c)[KRS § 433C.3-020(2) (c)].
79
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element of surprise may exist in allowing conviction for some of the

more broadly defined included offenses. 85
As the foregoing discussion of multiple offenses indicates the
Kentucky Penal Code provides no panacea for all of the difficulties
and injustices of the present system. Because of the multitudinous
circumstances under which overlapping offenses arise,86 establishing an
equitable formula for general application is extremely difficult. The
test formulated by the courts to determine identity of offenses demonstrates the perils confronted. 87 Recognizing the inherent difficulties,
the drafters confined their attempts to remedy multiple offense problems to restrictions on consecutive sentencing, 88 leaving to the Court
of Appeals the option of adding a compulsory joinder provision to the
89
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
B. The Effect of a FormerProsecution
The remainder of the Code's double jeopardy provisions concern
traditional situations wherein the defendant had been tried and is
subsequently prosecuted for the same or a related offense. Under both
federal and state constitutional prohibitions, the primary difficulty
has involved the determination of what constitutes "the same offense."90
This generally depended upon which of several tests (i.e., "same
offense," "same evidence," "same act," or "same transaction") the
court adopted. 91
When the subsequent prosecution is for the same offense under
identical facts and final judgment has not been reversed, the authorities unanimously agree that subsequent prosecution violates constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.9 2 However, the authorities
differ where (1) a case is terminated prior to a final determination
by the judge or jury; (2) the reprosecution involves a similar statutory
offense requiring proof of many, if not all, of the same facts, but which
is not technically the same statutory offense; (3) the former prosecution occurred in another jurisdiction; or (4) a defendant attempts to
85KYPC § 45(2)(c),(d) [KRS § 433.3-020(2)(c), (d)] could require a
defense against a conceptually different element of intent or injury. For instance

the accused might defend against intentional conduct on the basis of diminished
capacity or some other mitigating circumstance that might be unavailable if the
conduct were reckless or negligent.
86 See text accompanying notes 48-55 supra.
87 See text accompanying notes 21-32 supra.
88 KYPC § 270 [KRS § 435A.1-110].
89 See text accompanying note 71 supra.
90
See SiGLER, supra note 3, at 100.

91 See text accompanying notes 21-32 supra.
92 Even courts adopting the most narrow test have applied the constitutional
principle in this situation. See notes 135-43 infra and accompanying text LRC §
615, Commentary.
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use the double jeopardy provisions in a fraudulent manner to cut off
subsequent prosecution, by getting convicted in a lower court on a
lesser charge. Each of these situations is covered in the new Code.
C. The Effect of a FormerProsecution of the Same Offense
Where the same statutory offense is prosecuted a second time under
identical facts the constitutional protection will generally apply to
prevent the reprosecution.9 3 The Kentucky Penal Code extends this
same protection. KYPC § 46 [KRS § 433.2-030] provides the following limitations upon subsequent prosecution for the same offense:
When a prosecution is for a violation of the same statutory
provision and is based upon the same facts as a former prosecution,
it is barred by the former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in:
(a) an acquittal, or
(b) a conviction which has not subsequently been set
aside; or
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a determination by the
court, which has not subsequently been set aside, that
there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction; or
(3) The former prosecution was terminated by a final order
or judgment, which has not subsequently been set aside,
and which required a determination inconsistent with any
fact or legal proposition necessary to a conviction in a
subsequent prosecution; or
(4) The former prosecution was improperly terminated after
the first witness was sworn but before findings were
rendered by a trier of fact.
Termination under either of the following circumstances
is not improper:
(a) The defendant expressly consents to the termination
or by motion for mistrial or some other manner waives
his right to object to the termination; or
(b) The trial court, in exercise of its discretion,
finds that
94
the termination is manifestly necessary.
This section limits the application of the double jeopardy principle
to those instances where it has commonly been applicable in the past.
KYPC §§ 46(1), (2) [KRS §§ 483C.3-030(1), (2)] are consistent with
existing case law. 5 Since the state is not allowed to appeal an
acquittal, the defendant can never be reprosecuted for an offense for
See LRC § 615, Commentary.
KYPC § 46 [KRS § 433C.3-0301.
LRC § 615, Commentary, citing Commonwealth v. Ramey, 132 S.W.2d
342 (Ky. 1939)- Commonwealth v. Duvall, 295 S.W. 1047 (Ky. 1927); Turner
v. CommonwealtI, 272 S.W.726 (Ky. 1925); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 109 S.W.
353 (Ky. 1908).
93

94

95 See
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which he has been acquitted.98 If the defendant is convicted but the
97
judgment is reversed on appeal, the state can reprosecute on remand.
If a court's determination that evidence is insufficient to support a
conviction is set aside, another trial would be permissible; if upheld,
that determination would bar reprosecution. 98 KYPC § 46(2) [KRS §
433C.3-030(2)] requires the prosecutor to present sufficient evidence
to create a jury question upon every element of his case; otherwise,
the defendant must be set free. Therefore, the prosecution is prevented
from taking a defendant to trial for mere harassment. Unless the
prosecutor has enough evidence to prove his case, the state will be
forever barred.
KYPC § 46(3) [KRS § 483C.8-030(3)] governs situations where
the former prosecution is dismissed by a final court order or judgment
prior to trial. This provision places the point at which jeopardy attaches very early in the prosecution; 99 however, it is limited to situations where the basis for the dismissal was such that any subsequent
prosecution for the same offense would be inconsistent with that
ruling.100 It would apply, for instance, where the former prosecution
was dismissed because of the statute of limitations or immunity; 10 1
however, it would not apply to a dismissal for improper venue or a
defective indictment. If the cause of the dismissal can be corrected,
subsequent prosecution is proper; if it cannot be corrected, the former
prosecution bars subsequent prosecution. The legislature therefore
essentially extended the civil concept of res judicata to criminal
prosecutions. 02
The Code also deals with the situation where the trial is terminated
after the first witness takes the stand, but prior to a jury verdict. 03
If the trial is improperly terminated, the defendant can never be reprosecuted for that offense.0 4 The purpose of this restriction is to
assure the defendant that his guilt or innocence will be determined
96An acquittal is to be restricted to those situations where a jury or judge
renders a verdict or finding of not guilty, and is not intended to be dependent upon
the formal
entry of a judgment or order. LRC § 615, Commentary.
9T
This is consistent with existing law. See Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra
note 10, at 264 n.6.

98 LRC § 615, Commentary.
99 Id. The Commentary points out that this section is not dependent upon the
"attachment of jeopardy," since there is no requirement that any evidence be presented. However, it has the same effect as if jeopardy has attached in the traditional sense.
100 Id.

101 Id.

102 Id. The concept of res judicata is not followed exactly, since the prosecutor
cannot use a determination in a prior prosecution against the defendant in a subsequent prosecution. See Sxicr.a, supra note 3. at 90-91.
103 KYPC § 46(4) [KRS § 433C.3-030(4)].
104 Id.
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by the first jury to which he consents and to prevent an overzealous
prosecutor from withdrawing from a poorly prepared or presented
case because he fears acquittal.
The definition of "improper termination" provides only two occasions where termination prior to a final determination is proper. The
first is where the defendant requests or consents to the termination. 10 5
For example, if the defendant requests a mistrial, the termination is
proper, as it is under existing double jeopardy case law.106 If the
defendant believes he will be prejudiced by continuation of the
original prosecution, he can be retried by another jury. Proper
termination also occurs if the trial court in its discretion finds termination "manifestly necessary." 07 For example, if a juror dies or a defense
attorney becomes ill, the trial judge may find termination of the trial
necessary. 08 The guilty defendant would be unjustly benefitted if
he were allowed to escape punishment when the trial had to be
terminated for reasons other than prosecution misconduct or circumstances which make termination "manifestly necessary." This provision
and its rationale are consistent with past double jeopardy decisions. 10 9
D. The Effect of a Former Prosecutionfor Different Offenses
The next section of the Code dealing with the double jeopardy
principle concerns situations where a defendant is prosecuted for one
statutory offense, and is later prosecuted for a different offense. KYPC
§ 47 [KRS § 483C.3-040] determines whether prosecution is barred
by a former prosecution for a different offense.
Generally, prosecution for one offense should not bar subsequent
prosecution for a separate offense. 10 The double jeopardy prohibition
was never intended to shield a defendant from the consequences of
his various criminal acts; rather its purpose is to prevent the state from
charging a defendant with the same crime more than once. However,
under the present statutory scheme numerous offenses may arise from
a single criminal act."' The offenses differ only in the elements that
must be proved at trial".112 By redefining criminal conduct in a more
105 LRC § 615, Commentary.
106 Id. citing Riley v. Commonwealth, 227 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1921).
107 See LRC § 615, Commentary.
10 8 One critic argues that the test should be whether the cause was "intrinsic"
or "extrinsic" to the trial. If an extrinsic circumstance caused the termination,
there should be no bar. If an intrinsic circumstance caused the delay, the bar to
reprosecution would depend upon whether it was caused by the prosecutor, trial
judge, or the defendant. See SITLEn, supra note 3, at 223-24.
109 See LRC
§ 615, Commentary, citing Mullins v. Commonwealth, 80
S.W.2d 606, 608 (Ky. 1935).
11o See WORIaNG PAPERS, supra note 40, at 333.
11 Id. at 332. See also Sic.x, supranote 3, at 63-64.
112 See, e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
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logical and comprehensive manner the Code eliminates much of the
overlap of pre-Code law." 3 However, some overlap remains, and the
legislature may amend or supplement the Code in a manner that
destroys its internal consistency and creates greater overlapping of
offenses.
The drafters of the Code attempted to solve this problem by
limiting the power of the prosecutor to try a defendant twice for
different but similar offenses. KYPC § 47 [KRS § 433C.3-040], dealing
with the effect of a former prosecution for a different offense, provides:
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different statutory
provision than a former prosecution or for a violation of the same
provision but based upon different facts, it is barred by the former
prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in:
(a) an acquittal, or
(b) a conviction, or
(c) a determination that there was insufficient evidence
to warrant a conviction and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(1) An offense of which the defendant could have
been convicted at the first prosecution; or
(2) An offense involving the same conduct as the
first prosecution, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required in the other
prosecution or unless the offense was not consummated when the former prosecution began;
or
(2) The former prosecution was terminated by a final order or
judgment which has not subsequently been set aside and
which required a determination inconsistent wvith any
fact necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution; or
(3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated, as that
term is used in Section 46(4) of this act, and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had the
former
4
prosecution not been improperly terminated."
The first limitation upon subsequent prosecution involves offenses
for which the defendant could have been convicted at the former
trial." 5 This applies primarily to an included offense for which the
defendant can be convicted without being formally charged."" The
rationale is that since the defendant was subject to conviction for the
1134 See SIGLER, supra note 3. at 195-204.
"1 KYPC § 47 [KRS § 433C.3-040].
115 KYPC § 47(1)(a) [KRS § 433C.3-040(1)(a)].
116 KYPC § 45(2) [KRS § 433C.3-010(2)].
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included offense at the first prosecution, he has already been put in
jeopardy for that offense. Therefore, a defendant cannot be tried for
murder and then later prosecuted for attempted murder, manslaughter,
or assault based upon the same facts. 117 This provision protects the
defendant from harassment and reduces the unfair advantage that
would otherwise accrue to the prosecutor. The double jeopardy
clause as interpreted by the courts has long provided similar protection;
hence, this provision merely codifies existing law.118
The Code extends the limitation upon subsequent prosecutions to
include offenses for which the defendant could have been convicted
at the first prosecution had it not been improperly terminated. 119 The
exceptions to improper termination, discussed above, which permit
subsequent prosecution are applicable to this section. 20 KYPC § 47(3)
[KRS § 483C.8-040(3)] essentially codifies existing law.' 2 ' However,
neither it nor KYPC § 47(1)(a) [KRS § 488C.3-040(1)(a)], which
prevents prosecution for an included offense after final determination
of the greater offense, actually eliminate the unfairness caused by
overlapping crimes. In most instances, the defendant would still be
subject to multiple prosecutions for the same criminal conduct because
most multiple offenses do not fit into the category of an included
1 22
offense.
KYPC § 47(2) [KRS § 433C.3-040(2)] further restricts reprosecution by applying res judicata to criminal cases. 123 Where the former
prosecution required a determination inconsistent with conviction
at the subsequent prosecution, the former judgment will bar subsequent prosecution. The purpose of this provision is to prevent the
defendant from being tried twice upon the very same issues. For
example, if the defendant is first prosecuted for burglary, interposes
the sole defense of alibi, and is acquitted, he could not be later
prosecuted for a larceny involving the same burglary, since a conviction for larceny would be inconsistent with the former jury determination that the defendant was someplace else. 124 Hoag v. New
Jersey 25 illustrates the need for this provision. In that case, the
defendant had been tried for the robbery of A, B and C in a single
transaction. He defended upon the grounds of alibi and was acquitted.
§ 620, Commentary.
'S Id. citing Commonwealth v. Ladusaw, 10 S.W.2d 1089, 1090 (Ky. 1928).
117 LRC

119KYPC § 45(3) [KRS § 433C.3-040(3)].
120 See text accompanying notes 103-09 supra.
121 LRC § 620, Commentary.
''22 32 See
accompany
notes 48-54 infra.
But text
see note
87 supra.
124 For another example, see LRC § 615,
Commentary.
125 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
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Later, the prosecutor, not satisfied with the result, prosecuted the
defendant for the robbery of D, even though the robbery of D
occurred at the same time and place as the robbery of A, B and C.
He was found guilty, and the Supreme Court affirmed on the basis
of the same evidence rule. 1 26 One of the juries was obviously wrong,
and it makes little sense to resolve such conflict in favor of the
prosecutor. In order to protect against such an unjust result, KYPC
§ 47(2) [KRS § 433C.3-040(2)] was needed; however, difficulty arises
when the basis of the verdict is not clear. 127 For example, a defendant
could defend a charge of disorderly conduct on the grounds that the
incident did not occur in a public place and self defense. If the
defendant was acquitted and later charged with assault arising from
the same incident, it would be uncertain which defense was the basis
for the former acquittal. If the acquittal was based on the defense
that the place of the incident was not public, then a subsequent
prosecution for assault would be proper. However, if self defense
was the basis, the first acquittal should stand as a bar to the subsequent prosecution. Therefore, unless all applicable defenses introduced at the former trial are allowed as res judicata to a subsequent
prosecution, this restriction will not be effective.
The final limitation upon prosecution for a different offense is
KYPC § 47(1)(b) [KRS § 433C.-040(1)(b)], which provides subsequent prosecution for a different offense is barred by an acquittal,
conviction, or determination that there was insufficient evidence to
warrant a conviction at a former prosecution, and the subsequent
prosecution is for "an offense involving the same conduct as the first
prosecution." 128 This provision, taken alone, would seem intended to
eliminate the present inequities caused by overlapping offenses. If
the defendant is subject to only one prosecution when he is charged
with multiple offenses arising from the same conduct, the state would
not be in a position to harass the defendant with multiple prosecutions
or use the related offenses in any unfair manner. Therefore, this section eliminates multiple trials for overlapping offenses, although the
defendant would still be subject to multiple punishment since all
offenses could be joined at one trial.129
The Commentary to the Legislative Research Commission's final
draft of the Code supports the conclusion that this provision was
intended to eliminate multiple prosecutions for overlapping offenses:
126
127
128

Id. at 467.
See Note, Twice in Jeopardy,supra note 10, at 265.

1

But see text accompanying notes 70-76 supra.

29

KYPC § 47(1)(b) [KRS § 433C.3-040(1)(b)].
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Following an acquittal, a conviction, or a determination by the
court that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction,
a subsequent prosecution is barred by [KYPC § 47(1) (b) [KRS §

433C.3-040(1) (b)]] if it is for an offense involving the same
conduct as a former prosecution. For example: D is charged with
committing breach of peace by assaulting V, tried for this offense,
and convicted. He is then tried for assault and battery of V.

The former conviction would serve to bar the subsequent prosecution under [KYPC § 47(1) (b) [KRS § 433C.3-040(1) (b)]].130
This provision is a step in the proper direction, and was intended to
eliminate much of the confusion and unfairness now arising from
judicial interpretations of the double jeopardy principle. However,
the term "same conduct" is subject to a rather broad interpretation.13 '
In an effort to inform the courts that no such broad interpretation was
intended, the drafters placed an exception upon the "same conduct"
rule.

Unfortunately, the exception appears to consume the general rule
barring subsequent prosecution for an offense involving the "same
conduct." The exception permits subsequent prosecution of a defendant even for an offense involving the "same conduct," where

"each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required in the other

prosecution."'32 This language is so similar to the language used by
courts adopting the "same evidence" test that it is difficult to assign
it any other meaning. 33 Therefore, although the general rule seems
to eliminate some of the inequities caused by overlapping offenses,
the exception reinstates the confusion of current double jeopardy
law and destroys the potential effectiveness of the general rule.
The confusion caused by the "same conduce' rule and its exception
is demonstrated by the cases which the drafters cite in the Commentary to show that these rules are consistent with existing law.134
They refer to Carman v. Commonwealth 35 as being consistent with
the "same conduct" rule. In that case the Court citing from an earlier
case, stated:
And the Commonwealth, by giving different names to the same
thing, or by prosecuting under different statutes, cannot multiply
13o LRC § 620, Commentary.
131 For instance, it could be interpreted to include totally unrelated offenses
where they arose during the same criminal episode. Therefore, a defendant under
this interpretation would be subject to only one prosecution for murder and
robbery itthey occurred during the same criminal transaction.
132 KYPC § 47(1)(b) [KRS § 433C.3-040(1)(b)].
133 See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
34
1
LRC § 620, Commentary.
13576 S.W. 1078 (Ky. 1903).
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offenses out of one or the same series of acts committed by the
accused.' 3 6
While the Legislature may pronounce as many combinations of
things criminal as it pleases, resulting not unfrequently [sic] in
a plurality of crimes in one transaction, or even in one act, for
any of which there may be a conviction without regard to the
others, "it is," in the language of Cockburn, D. J., "a fundamental
rule of law that out of the same facts a series of charges shall not
be preferred." To give our constitutional provision the force evidently meant, and to render it effectual, "the same offense" must
be interpreted as equivalent to the same act. And judicial utterthere can be
ances have even gone apparently to the extent that
37
only one punishment for one criminal transaction.'
This language indicates that the defendant should not be prosecuted
where both offenses arise out of the same act. Thus, it appears to be
an attempt on the part of the Court to adopt the "same act" test.138
The Commentary then cites Centersv. Commonwealth'39 as demonstrating the exception to the "same act" or "same conduct" rule. In
Centers the Court quotes the language of an earlier case 14° which
states:
But if the facts, which will convict on the second prosecution,
would not necessarily have convicted on the first, then the first will
not be a bar to the second, although the offenses charged may have
been committed in the same transaction. If the evidence required
to convict under the first indictment would not be sufficient to
convict under the second, but proof of an additional fact would be
necessary to constitute the offense charged in the second, then the
be pleaded in bar to the
former conviction or
41 acquittal cannot
second indictment.'
The Court thus appears to adopt the "same evidence" test,142 which
permits a second prosecution if the subsequent prosecution requires
proof of an additional fact not required at the former prosecution.
Reconciliation of Carmn and Centers is difficult, for each espouses a
different, conflicting concept of the scope of the double jeopardy
clause. The "same evidence" test is not an exception to the "same
act" or "same conduct" test; on the contrary, it is diametrically opposed.
In other words, where the "same evidence" test is employed, the
336 Id. at 1078.
137 Id. at 1079.
18 See text accompanying note 29 supra.
'39 318 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1958).

14o Medlock v. Commonwealth, 288 S.W. 670,
141 318 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Ky. 1958).
142 See text accompanying notes 28-28 supra.

671 (Ky. 1926).
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prosecutor is generally free to prosecute for overlapping offenses;
where the "same act" test is used, prosecution for overlapping offenses
is practically eliminated. 143 When faced with a case involving this
problem, the courts will probably be unable to rectify the confusion
and will fall back upon existing case law to reach a decision. If so,
this statutory revision has done little to resolve the inequities caused
by overlapping offenses.
The drafters of the Code intended to adopt neither the "same
act" nor the "same evidence" test. They used the language "same
conduct" in an effort to abandon these common law tests. 44 Further,
the language of the exception, although susceptible to interpretation
as a "same evidence" test, does not adopt the customary terminology
of that test. The "same evidence" test allows the defendant to be
prosecuted for each offense provided either offense requires proof of
facts not required by the other,145 the Code allows subsequent
prosecution only if both or each offense requires proof of a fact not
required by the other.146 Therefore, under the Code, not only must
the second prosecution require proof of a fact not required by the
first, but the former offense must also require proof of a fact that need
not be proved in the second prosecution. 147 For example, under the
"same evidence" test only the second prosecution required proof of a
fact not common to the first. Therefore, a defendant could be convicted for selling narcotics at the first trial and selling narcotics without a prescription at the second, since "without a prescription" was a
different fact. Under the Code, on the other hand, the first prosecution
would be a bar to the second prosecution since only the second prosecution required only proof of an additional fact. 14 The first prosecution
did not require proof of any fact which did not have to be proved at the
second prosecution. Therefore, KYPC § 47(1) (b) [KRS § 433C.3-040
(1) (b) I appears to bar subsequent prosecution for a greater offense
after a prosecution for an included offense, since generally only the
greater offense requires proof of a fact not required in the former
149
prosecution.
Even though the exception may not be as restrictive as it first
appears, there are instances where a literal reading of the provision
could work injustice since all offenses that overlap do not differ merely
See text accom,anying notes 23-29 supra.
"Same conduct' is not necessarily synonymous with "same act" or "same
transaction"; therefore, the courts are not forced to rely upon the old tests.
146 See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
. 4 0 See KYPC § 47(1)(b) [KRS § 433C.3-040(1)(b)].
147
LRC § 620, Commentary.
1 48
See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra.
149 KYPC § 45(2) [KIS § 433C.3-020(2)1.
143
144
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in that one offense requires proof of an additional element. For
example, if the first offense was selling narcotics without a license and
the second was selling narcotics without a written order, the first
prosecution would not necessarily bar the second since each requires
proof of a different fact. In other words, an unscrupulous prosecutor
could still prosecute a defendant twice for essentially the same criminal
conduct by merely ensuring that the offenses each have one minor, yet
different, element. Therefore, not only is the provision susceptible to a
"same evidence" interpretation by the courts, it is also susceptible to a
literal interpretation that would enable a clever prosecutor to circumvent its language and subject the defendant to multiple prosecutions.
An additional exception to the "same conduce' rule applies where
the subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was not consummated
when the former prosecution was commenced. 150 The purpose of this
exception is to prevent the defendant from escaping the charge merely
because the subsequent offense was incomplete at the time of the first
prosecution. For example, where the defendant is convicted of
assault and the victim later dies, a subsequent prosecution for murder
would not be barred.151 Of course, if the defendant were acquitted
at the first trial and the victim later died, KYPC § 47(2) [KRS §
152
488C.040(2) ] would prohibit a later prosecution for murder.
E. The Effect of a FormerProsecutionin Another Jurisdiction
When criminal conduct subjects a defendant to prosecution in more
than one state, the general rule has been to allow prosecution in each
state,15 3 even when the prosecutions are for the same offense. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals has adopted this view; 54 however, the
Code reverses the judicial rule and bars subsequent prosecution in
this state where the defendant has been formerly prosecuted for a
similar offense in another jurisdiction. 5 5 The reason for this change
is that it makes little sense to bar subsequent prosecution within one
jurisdiction, but to allow it if two jurisdictions are involved. The
same fundamental unfairness to the defendant exists in each case.15
KYPC § 47(1)(b) [KRS § 433C.3-040(1)(b)].
151 LRC § 620, Commentary.
152 A prosecution for murder would probably be inconsistent with the determination that the defendant was innocent of an alleged assault involving the
same incident. KYPC § 47(2) [KRS § 433C.3-040(2)].
153 Scr.m, supra note 3, at 95-96.
154 LRC § 625, Commentary, citing Lem v. Commonwealth, 419 S.W.2d 759
(Ky. 1967).
155 LRC § 625, Commentary.
156 To argue that prosecution and punishment for overlapping offenses is
unjust if in the same jurisdiction logically requires the same conclusion if there are
two jurisdictions involved.
350
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Therefore, to extend this protection to all Kentucky defendants, KYPC
§ 48 [KRS § 433C.3-050] provides:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent
jurisdiction of this state and of the United States or another state,
a prosecution in such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent
prosecution in this state under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in:
(a) an acquittal, or
(b) a conviction, or
(c) a determination that there was insufficient evidence
to warrant a conviction which had not subsequently
been set aside, and the subsequent prosecution is
for an offense involving the same conduct unless:
(i) Each prosecution requires proof of a fact not
required in the other prosecution; or
(ii) The offense involved in the subsequent prosecution was not consummated when the former
prosecution began; or
(2) The former prosecution was terminated in a final order or
judgment which has not subsequently been set aside and
which required a determination inconsistent with any fact
157
necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
This section adopts the language of KYPC 47 [KRS § 433C.3040] involving the "same conduct" rule with its exceptions and is subject to the same problems of interpretation and scope previously discussed.'5 s However, this section is not sufficiently broad to include
as a bar to subsequent prosecution every prosecution that bars subsequent prosecution within the same jurisdiction. For example, an
improperly terminated prosecution in another state does not bar subsequent prosecution in this state. The reason behind the more narrow application of double jeopardy principles to a subsequent
prosecution in this state after a former prosecution in another state is,
according to the Commentary, the difference in the criminal law of
the various jurisdictions. 15 9
KYPC § 48(2) [KRS § 433C.8-050(2)] extends the concept of res
judicata to a prosecution in another jurisdiction. 60 If the determination
made in the former prosecution in another state would be inconsistent
with a conviction in this state, subsequent prosecution in this state is
barred.' 61 This provision extends "full-faith-and-credit" to criminal
'15 KYPC § 48 [KRS § 633.3-050].
See text accompanying notes 130-49 supra.
s58
'59 LRC § 625, Commentary.
160 Id.
161 Id.
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prosecutions brought in other states to prevent possible harassment
and double jeopardy.
F. The Effect of a Former ProsecutionFraudulently
Procuredor Before A Court Lacking Jurisdiction
The final double jeopardy section of the Code 16 2 is intended to
prevent the defendant from using the double jeopardy provisions to
fraudulently escape more severe punishment. The principal deception
this section is intended to defeat occurs where the defendant goes into
a lower court before all the facts are known and pleads guilty to a
minor offense stemming from his criminal conduct, receives a small
fine, and then seeks to invoke the protection of the double jeopardy
provisions of the Code to escape the greater punishment to which he
would otherwise have been subject. 63 To prevent this practice KYPC
§ 49 [KRS § 433C.8-060] provides:
A prosecution is not barred, as provided in [KYPC § 46, 47 and 48]

of this Act if the former prosecution:

(a) Was procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the
proper prosecuting officer and with the purpose of avoiding
the sentence which otherwise might be imposed; or

(b) Was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.'6 4
The purpose of this safeguard is to prevent abuse of the double
jeopardy provisions by the defendant.
KYPC § 49(b) [KRS § 433C.3-060(2)] prevents the defendant from
escaping prosecution and punishment when he is mistakenly tried before a court lacking jurisdiction. 6 5 Since prosecution in a court lacking
jurisdiction is invalid from its inception, the defendant was never put
in jeopardy. He could overturn the conviction and escape punishment
unless a second prosecution can be maintained in the proper jurisdiction. Some injustice may result if a defendant convicted in a court
lacking jurisdiction served part of his sentence before the conviction
was overturned, and additional protection may be necessary to cover
this contingency.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Kentucky Penal Code double jeopardy provisions are basically
a codification of existing law; however, in a few instances the protection
KYPC § 49 [KRS § 433C.3-060].
163
LRC § 630, Commentary.
1
64KYPC § 49 [KRS § 4330.3-060].
165 LRC § 630, Commentary.
162
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given to the defendant has been extended. The definition of "included
offense" has been expanded in KYPC § 45(2) [KRS § 483C.8-020]166
to protect a defendant from multiple convictions under KYPC § 45(1)
(a) [KRS § 483C.8-020 (1) (a)]; the defendant is subject to conviction
167
for either the greater offense or an included offense but not for both.
KYPC § 47(1)(b) [KRS § 483C.8-040(1)(b)] sets forth the "same
conduct" rule and protects the defendant from reprosecution for a
greater offense'0 6 or an offense created merely by adding an additional
element to the prior offense.' 69 Unfortunately, the Code provision
which sets forth the "same conduct" rule contains an exception where
70
"each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required in the other,"
and this creates confusion since the wording of the exception
closely parallels the language of the "same evidence" test.' 7 ' Further
a clever prosecutor could avoid the statute's intended effect in some
instances if the statute was interpreted too literally. Unless steps are
taken to clarify and broaden the scope of this provision, it will be ineffective as a device to curtail the power of the prosecutor in overlapping and multiple offense situations.
There is also a need for a compulsory joinder provision,172 which
would remove the prosecutor's opportunity to use overlapping and
multiple offenses to harass or gain an unfair advantage over a defendant. 73 He would be required to bring all known charges at one
trial or be forever barred. Whether compulsory joinder would be best
implemented by amendment to the Rules of Criminal Procedure or
the Code is beyond the scope of this note. However, since the drafters
of the Code apparently view compulsory joinder as a procedural matter,174 amending the Rules may be the only foreseeable means of
accomplishing this result.
The Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code contains a comprehensive treatment of double jeopardy problems. 175 It, like the
Model Penal Code, provides for compulsory joinder of all offenses
"based on the same conduct, arising from the same criminal episode,
or based on a series of acts or omissions motivated by a common
166 See text accompanying notes 77-81 supra.
167 See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
168 See text accompany note 149 supra.
169 See text accompanying notes 145-48 supra.
170KYC § 47(1)(b) [KRS § 433C.3-040(1)(b)].
171 See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
172 See text accompanying note 65 supra.
173 See text preceding note 67 supra.
174 See text accompanying note 69 supra.
175 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CnmsNAJL LAW, STUDY
DRArFr OF A Nmv FEDERAL CaMtNAL CODE §§ 703-08 (1970) [herinafter cited
as STumy DnAFr].
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purpose or plan and which result in the repeated commission of the
same offense or affect the same person or persons or their property.
... 176 The prosecutor is free to prefer all charges conceivably committed by the defendant. Therefore, this provision alone, like KYPC §
45 [KRS § 483C.3-020], would not prevent the defendant from suffering multiple punishment. The rationale for allowing the prosecutor to
bring all separate charges and obtain a conviction on any one is that
otherwise he would have the difficult task of selecting the best to
77
bring to trial.'
The Federal Penal Code limits the punishment that can be imposed
upon a defendant convicted of multiple offenses. Similar to the
limitation in KYPC § 270 [KRS § 485A.1-110], 78 this restriction reduces the effect of convictions for multiple and overlapping offenses.
The Working Papers to the Federal Code explain that the premise of
the draft provisions should be "not so much a matter of the number of
offenses for which a person shall stand convicted, but of how offenders
should be dealt with and the duration of permissible punishment
reasonably determined." i 79 Another commentator expressed the problem in another manner stating:
Finally, and most importantly, power to cumulate punishments
involves an irrational kind of discretion. The aim of sentencing
discretion is individualized punishment. The judge must determine the criminal's capacity for rehabilitation, and society's appetite for retribution, in each case. All species of psychological and
biographical information are relevant to both decisions. But one fact
which is not relevant is the number of closely related or overlapping offenses that can be spun out of the defendant's conduct. 8 0
The Federal Penal Code attempts to overcome this irrational basis for
increased punishment under the existing double jeopardy approach
by providing that a defendant may not be sentenced consecutively
for more than one offense when "the offenses differ only in that one
is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the
other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct."' 81 The drafters
explained that an alternative and more general statement might be:
The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which
were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which
176
177

Id. § 703.
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See text accompanying note 41 supra.

178 See text accompanying notes 70-76 supra.
'79 WORIG PAPERS, supra note 40, at 332.
180 Note, Twice in jeopardy, supra note 10, at 307.
DRAFT,

supra note 175, at § 3206(2).
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there was2 no substantial change in the nature of the criminal ob8
jective.

This would essentially protect a defendant from multiple punishment
for overlapping offenses.' 8 3 This alternate Federal Code provision
would provide greater protection than KYPC § 270 [KRS § 435A.1-110],
since it specifically applies to overlapping and multiple offenses to
protect the defendant from being punished twice for what is essentially
the same conduct. The Kentucky provision applies to all multiple convictions regardless of the circumstances and does not completely bar
multiple punishment. Therefore, enactment in Kentucky of a specific
multiple punishment provision similar to that of the Federal Code
should be considered for overlapping offenses.
Finally, as discussed above, KYPC § 47(1) (b) [KRS § 433C.3-040
(1) (b)] may require clarification and expansion to effectively prevent
the prosecutor from using overlapping offenses unfairly. 84 Language
in the Federal Code appears to move sufficiently provide for subsequent prosecutions for different although overlapping offenses. A
former prosecution for a different offense should bar subsequent
prosecution where "the subsequent prosecution is based on the same
conduct or arose from the same criminal episode, unless (i) the law
defining the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted
or acquitted is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil
from the law defining the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted, or (ii) the second offense was not consummated when the
first trial began." 8 5 This provision has the advantage of not being
susceptible to interpretation as a "same evidence" test since, unlike
KYPC § 47(1)(b) [KRS § 433C.-040(1)(b)], it is not couched in
terms similar to the "same evidence" test.8 6 Adoption of the language
of the Federal Code would correct many of the inadequacies of the
KYPC section dealing with subsequent prosecution for a different
offense; yet, it would not allow a defendant to escape prosecution for
unrelated offenses committed in the course of the criminal transaction
or episode. A more equitable and rational resolution of the double
jeopardy problem would therefore result.
In closing, it should be noted that since the Kentucky Penal Code
approach to double jeopardy is not sufficiently broad to eliminate all the
difficulties caused by overlapping offenses, it could be susceptible to
182 Id. Comments, at 289-90.
183 See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra.
184 See text following note 171 supra.
185 STruy Daz'r, supra note 175, at § 706.
186 See text accompanying notes 132-33 supra.
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constitutional attack. 8 7 Although under current law no immediate
threat exists, 88 there are indications that the attitude of the Supreme
Court may be changing. 89 Pressure to broaden the scope of double
jeopardy has increased, and has pushed the prevailing attitude in that
direction. If the Court should adopt a "same transaction" or "same act"
approach, 190 the Kentucky Penal Code provisions might be ruled unconstitutional. Broadening the scope of the provisions to the extent
previously suggested would decrease the likelihood that the statute
could be held unconstitutional, since most of the difficulties caused
by overlapping and multiple offenses would be eliminated, the constitutional mandate would be satisfied.
Neil S. Hackworth
187 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
188 See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
189 See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436 (1970); Wailer v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
190 See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.

